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On the Character of Consciousness
Arto Annila 1, 2*
1Department of Physics, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland, 2Department of Biosciences, University of Helsinki, Helsinki,
Finland
The human brain is a particularly demanding system to infer its nature from observations.
Thus, there is on one hand plenty of room for theorizing and on the other hand a
pressing need for a rigorous theory. We apply statistical mechanics of open systems to
describe the brain as a hierarchical system in consuming free energy in least time. This
holistic tenet accounts for cellular metabolism, neuronal signaling, cognitive processes all
together, or any other process by a formal equation of motion that extends down to the
ultimate precision of one quantum of action. According to this general thermodynamic
theory cognitive processes are no different by their operational and organizational
principle from other natural processes. Cognition too will emerge and evolve along
path-dependent and non-determinate trajectories by consuming free energy in least
time to attain thermodynamic balance within the nervous system itself and with its
surrounding systems. Specifically, consciousness can be ascribed to a natural process
that integrates various neural networks for coherent consumption of free energy, i.e., for
meaningful deeds. The whole hierarchy of integrated systems can be formally summed
up to thermodynamic entropy. The holistic tenet provides insight to the character of
consciousness also by acknowledging awareness in other systems at other levels of
nature’s hierarchy.
Keywords: causality, cognition, free energy, non-determinism, the principle of least action, the second law of
thermodynamics
INTRODUCTION
Cognition is an ability that one has inherited from the evolutionary course of human species and
its ancestors as well as accumulated in the course of one’s own life from numerous experiences
and incidences during diverse developmental and maturation processes. To perceive cognition in
this way as a product of various processes raises a profound question: What is a change? Namely,
an event, development or evolution as a whole ultimately consists of changes from one state to
another. The decimation of any process to a series is familiar from physics but the conceptualization
is not remote to neuroscience either (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2001; John, 2002; Perlovsky and
Kozma, 2007; Freeman and Vitiello, 2009; Fingelkurts et al., 2010a, 2013). Moreover, cognition
is not only one’s arsenal from the past, but a present process for one to target toward future.
Consequently we think that the concept of change is pivotal in comprehending cognition in general
and its consciousness character in particular.
We are further motivated to make sense of cognition using the universal notion of change
because the human brain, as the primary premise of cognition, displays in its structures
and functions the same patterns as numerous other systems throughout nature (Linkenkaer-
Hansen et al., 2001; Eguíluz et al., 2005; Mäkelä and Annila, 2010; He et al., 2013). For
example, neural activity is no different from seismic activity, both comply with power
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laws (Touboul and Destexhe, 2010). A neuronal network, just
as the World Wide Web, has a skewed distribution of nodes’
degrees (van den Heuvel et al., 2008). Neural activity exhibits
waves, oscillations, spiraling sequences and at times chaotic
behavior just like economic activity displays cycles, trends
and occasionally tumultuous conducts (Schroeder, 1991; Huang
et al., 2010; Friedman and Landsberg, 2013).No question, the
ubiquitous patterns have been recognized in diverse disciplines
including neuroscience (Chialvo, 2010), but the main point
remains unappreciated: The common characteristics result from
natural processes, that is, from series of changes.
Evolution of any kind, when broken down to a succession
of changes, can be given by an equation of motion. In this
way the thermodynamic theory explains the recurrent patterns
to result from least-time free energy consumption (Sharma
and Annila, 2007). In other words, the skewed distributions
are energetically optimal, and hence their cumulative sigmoid
growth and decline curves are also optimal in energetic
terms. The power laws, in turn, are ubiquitous by being
central approximations of the sigmoid curves. The evolutionary
equation asserts that natural systems evolve in non-deterministic
and path-dependent manner (Annila and Salthe, 2010a). Also
cognitive processes, unmistakably learning and decision making,
share these universal attributes (Arthur, 1994; Bassanini and
Dosi, 2001; Anttila and Annila, 2011). For these reasons we
are motivated to employ the general theory to make sense
of cognition and especially of its seemingly elusive conscious
character.
Disciplines have branched far from their common stem in
natural philosophy, and hence holism is today an unconventional
tenet. Thus, our assertion that the human brain is no different
by its operational and organizational principle from any other
system in nature may appear odd and groundless at first
sight. To justify our reasoning we will begin by outlining
the thermodynamic theory (Chapter 2) and thereafter work
insight to consciousness by relating the holistic perspective to
various puzzles, phenomena, and well-known stances (Chapter
3). Finally, we summarize conclusions of the thermodynamic
tenet to further debate and discourse (Chapter 4). As it will
become apparent, our study does not yield groundbreaking
resolutions, rather it substantiates common sense by a firm
formalism.
THERMODYNAMICS OF OPEN SYSTEMS
We reason that the human brain is no different from other
systems in nature because its structures and functions display the
ubiquitous patterns, i.e., distributions that sum up along sigmoid
curves which, in turn, mostly follow power laws. Hence, the brain
ought to be described and comprehended in the same way as any
other system.
To this end the general principle of nature is known, in fact by
many names, most notably as the second law of thermodynamics,
the principle of least action and Newton’s second law of motion.
These three laws appear as if they were distinct from one
and other when erroneously expressed in their determinate,
i.e., calculable forms. For example, textbooks tend to present
Newton’s second law of motion so that force F = ma equals
mass m times acceleration a = dtv, i.e., the change in velocity v.
However, Newton himself wrote that the force F = dtp equals a
change in momentum p, which yields by the definition p = mv
not one but two terms F = mdtv + vdtm. The change in mass
relates via dm= dE/c2 to dissipation of photons ultimately to the
cold space. Dissipation is inherent in any change, and hence it is
also integral to cognition.
Likewise, the principle of least action in its original
form due to Maupertuis includes dissipation in contrast to
the familiar constant-energy, hence deterministic Lagrangian
(De Maupertuis, 1746; Tuisku et al., 2009). Furthermore,
statistical mechanics, as the probabilistic many-body theory
underlying thermodynamics, can be formulated for open
dissipative systems. However, when imposing the constant-
energy condition, statistical mechanics limits to stationary
systems (Kondepudi and Prigogine, 1998).
Dissipation, despite being an integral component of any
change, may still appear as a downright secondary byproduct of
neural activity. Yet, when a systems theory misses even a single
and seemingly insignificant photon, such a theory does obviously
not account for everything and leaves room for unaccounted
effects, surmise and speculation. Of course, when probing neural
activity in practice, knowledge of numerous factors will remain
imperfect, but all the more the theory’s bookkeeping of causes
and effects, i.e., forces and ensuing motions, ought to be perfect.
The Physical Basis
Today, when complex systems are more often modeled and
simulated than described and explained, our ambition to account
for everything with accuracy and precision extending down to a
single photon might seem as an exceptional, perhaps even as an
unattainable and abstract attempt. Therefore, it is worth stressing
that for us an explanation is genuine only when it relates to
everyday experience. For instance, the well-known conjecture
that quantum mechanics could underlie consciousness (Bohm,
2002; Pylkkänen, 2014) does not qualify for us as an explanation,
because entangled and superposed states do not make sense to
us. The legendary illustration of a microscopic system being
in two states at the same time by a cat being alive and dead
at the same time simply does not seem sensible to us. The
observed indeterminism implies to us that we just do not know
the state of cat that goes missing. Likewise, we refute the idea
in statistical mechanics that an observable state would sum up
from a probability distribution of microscopic configurations,
because the microstate (Mandl, 1971), in contrast to the state, is a
theoretical concept without a discernable counterpart. In practice
one microstate cannot be distinguished from another.
Surely, our stance can be argued against by claiming that not
everything is necessarily tangible to the human being, but then
again no observation is either free from some interpretation.
Mere numbers mean nothing. Thus, mere agreement with
recordings is no guarantee that non-determinism and purported
non-localism as well as emergence could not be explained
without conceptual conundrums (Annila and Kallio-Tamminen,
2012). It is worth noting that Schrödinger equation is devoid
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of dissipation (Griffiths, 2004), and hence it does not comply
with observations that all changes are dissipative. Likewise, the
textbook statistical mechanics accounts for the system when at
thermodynamic equilibrium, not when in dissipative evolution
from one state to another (Gibbs, 1902).
We think that the theory of cognition ought to be given in
the form of an equation because mathematical notation leaves
less room for ambiguity than natural language. By the same
token, Darwin’s theory, as the corner stone of biology, is not a
theory by standards of physics but a narrative, albeit a conceivable
one. Then again, an equation alone is no theory. Namely, when
variables of a mathematical model fail to correspond to causes
and effects, there is no enlightenment.
Traditionally rules and regularities have been deduced
from meticulous measurements. Kepler’s laws are examples of
formalized observations. In neuroscience this approach is hardly
an option. Recordings do not reproduce precisely enough to infer
an equation of motion. Instead mathematical models, such as
Markov chains that mimic data, more or less, are fashionable
in providing predictions, at least trends (Laing and Lord, 2009).
However, the model parameters do not map one-to-one with
causes and effects. The introduced statistical indeterminism,
i.e., randomness without reason, is not a substitute for non-
determinism. It follows from the path-dependence of natural
processes.
To obtain an equation by starting from an axiom is yet
another possibility. For example, the axiom that inertia is
distinguishable from gravity, known as equivalence principle,
underlies general relativity (Misner et al., 1973). In neuroscience
this approach for finding axioms does not appear amenable
either. Recordings hardly display invariants to get hold of
the foundation. Nonetheless, one may construct the theory by
inferring or postulating self-evident axioms and challenge only
ensuing conclusions (Tononi, 2008; Tononi and Koch, 2015).
However, we would prefer axioms that are directly verifiable
in terms of physics, but then neuroscience cannot stand out
as a distinct discipline, its concepts cannot be chosen self-
sufficiently, and its objects of study cannot be singled out as
unique phenomena.
We find the ancient atomism (Berryman, 2011) as a sound
and solid stance. It claims that everything comprises indivisible
basic building blocks. Since the atom, as a chemical element,
turned out to be divisible, the most elementary constituent was
renamed as the quantum of action. The quantum of light is its
most familiar embodiment. The human eye can register even a
single photon and our skin is sensitive to photon influxes and
eﬄuxes that are sensed as hot and cold. Thus, the photons are
real by everyday experience, and hence the quantum of action
qualifies for us as a tangible entity. The quantum-embodied
atomism is further motivated because every chemical reaction
will either emit or absorb at least one photon. Also annihilation
of matter with antimatter yields only photons. Also other
observations substantiate the axiom that everything, and hence
also cognition, is ultimately embodied by the quantized actions
(Annila, 2010, 2012; Varpula et al., 2013). The atomism is not
new to neurosciences either. It has been formulated in at least
in neurophysiological context (Fingelkurts et al., 2009, 2010a).
The quantum of action has energy E and time t as its attributes,
or equivalently momentum p and wavelength x, so that their
product is invariant known as Planck’s constant
h = Et = p · x. (1)
In other words, energy and time do not exist as such. They are
characteristics of the quanta (Annila, 2016). Surely, Equation (1)
is mathematically equivalent to the textbook form E = hf, where
frequency f = 1/t, but then it is not evident that h is the quantum’s
measure. The invariance means, for example, that the wavelength
will change along with changing momentum but the photon
itself remains intact. Consequently, we find virtual photons as an
abstract theoretical construct without correspondence to reality
(Peskin and Schroeder, 1995).
A system changes from one state to another by acquiring
quanta from its surroundings or by losing quanta to its
surroundings. Thus, the change in energy is, according to
Equation (1), invariably accompanied with the change of time.
This is common sense. For example, a chemical reaction will
progress in the course of time by acquiring or expelling quanta
that carry energy as heat until a stationary state has been attained.
Many a biological system is recurrently subject to changes due to
its changing surroundings. Therefore, animate will hardly ever
attain and reside in thermodynamic steady states. Specifically,
the central nervous system is incessantly receiving and sending
impulses to its surroundings comprising the body and beyond.
In practice there is hardly a way to keep track of all quanta
embodying even a microscopic system, but formally the system
can be described with the precision of one quantum. This
is not only a remarkable but consequential resolution. Not
only is the neural network no different from any other energy
transduction system, but the atomistic axiom excludes other
factors. Put differently, if one were to argue that consciousness
is not embodied by quanta, the stance would violate causality by
introducing some other constituents from nothing. That is to say,
a cause of any kind is ultimately nothing but an energy difference,
i.e., some form of free energy. Its ensuing effect is nothing but a
quantized flow of energy. Thus, causal power, as a characteristic
of consciousness (Kim, 1992), is inherent in the thermodynamic
description.
Our approach to account for the entirety in terms of quanta
undoubtedly resembles reductionism. The idea that the system is
nothing but the sum of its parts has been refuted, for instance, by
referring to emergent characteristics of consciousness. Likewise,
properties of a molecule cannot be inferred from properties of
its constituent atoms. However, the molecule does not form
only from atoms, but also from the photons that couple from
surroundings to the synthesis (Pernu and Annila, 2012). If
these quanta are not included in the description, obviously the
molecular characteristics remain unaccounted. Conversely, no
new property will appear from mere permutations of systemic
constituents. Instead a novel characteristic will appear along with
the flux of quanta from the surroundings to the system or vice
versa. In other words, the monistic account (Stoljar, 2015) is in
fact complete when every quantum of action is included. This
essential role of surroundings in emergence has been pointed
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also in neuroscience (Rudrauf et al., 2003; Revonsuo, 2006;
Fingelkurts et al., 2010b).
We realize that our physicalism does not immediately
enlighten, for instance, subjective conscious experience, i.e.,
qualia, which is the contested concept about the ways things
seem to us (Dennett, 1988; Chalmers, 1995). True enough, one
does adhere meanings beyond mere perception. For instance, the
sensation of red color is not only about registering corresponding
energy of the photons at the retina, but the influx will trigger
processes that involve more. What exactly is implicated may not
be easily exposed in practice, but in any case we maintain that
the supervening processes can be formally described with the
exactness of one quantum.
The Systems Description
The above preliminaries pave the way for the formal description
of a system. Since all entities are understood to comprise of the
basic building blocks, any entity can be related to any other in
energetic terms. So, all those entities that one chooses to refer to
as the system can be placed on an energy level diagram (Figure 1).
This description can be formalizedmathematically irrespective of
complexity (Mäkelä and Annila, 2010).
According to the general theory of many-body systems the
state can be expressed concisely and completely in terms of
probability P. It is the measure of what it takes to have,
for example, a pool of certain neurotransmitter molecules in
a synaptic vesicle. Undoubtedly, it will take a lot of things.
Precursors are needed for syntheses of transmitters as well as
energy-rich chemicals are required to power the production.
Moreover, machinery for the syntheses and molecular transport
is necessary. In practice we do not know all factors that are
involved in attaining the particular state of synaptic vesicle.
Nonetheless, we may formally denote the probability Pj for the
pool of neurotransmitters, in numbers Nj, by accounting for all
those vital ingredients, each in numbers Nk, using the product
form Pk. It ensures that if any one of the vital ingredients is
missing altogether, not a single neurotransmitter molecule will
be found in the vesicle. Of course, it is not the mere number Nk
of substrates that matters but also the substrate’s energy attribute
Gk. Specifically, Pj depends on the difference between energy
Nkexp(Gk/kBT) that is bound in the substrates and energy that
is bound in the product exp(Gj/kBT) as well as on the difference
in energy that couples from surroundings via flux of photons to
the synthesis of the j-entities from k-entities, i.e., exp(1Qjk/kBT).
Formally this dependence of Pj on energetics is given by
Pj =
[∏
k= 1
Nke
−1Gjk/kBT e+i1Qjk/kBT
]Nj
/Nj! (2)
for the population of Nj products. All energy terms are relative to
the average energy of the system per particle, denoted by kBT for
historical reasons. The division by factorialNj! takes into account
energetically equivalent permutations. It is worth emphasizing
that these configurations, that the system cannot distinguish
energetically, populate the same state. This is of course common
sense. If one cannot distinguish one entity from another, one
claims that they are identical. One’s ability or any other system’s
ability to make a distinction requires ultimately recognition of
some difference in energy. For the sake of clarity, imaginary part
i in Equation (2) distinguishes energy in radiation, known as the
vector potential, from quantizedmaterial forms of energy, known
as the scalar potential (Figure 1). The probability of any other
population can be denoted in the same way as Pj. Then the total
FIGURE 1 | System is portrayed in terms of an energy level diagram along its evolutionary path at three states (A–C). Each diagram pictures various
populations Nk of entities, each with energy attribute Gk . Vertical arrows indicate paths of transformations, i.e., changes from k-entities in the population Nk to
j-entities in the population Nj . Horizontal wavy arrows denote influx and efflux of photons that invariably couple to these transformations. Horizontal bow arrows, in
turn, mean inconsequential exchange of indistinguishable entities. The system evolves, step-by-step, via absorptive and emissive jk-transformations from one state to
another toward ever more probable partitions, denoted by P =
∏
Pj , eventually arriving at a stationary-state balance where its average energy kBT equals energy
density in the system’s surroundings. The outlined skewed partition accumulates along a sigmoid curve (dotted) which follows mostly a straight line on a log-log scale
(insert) for entropy S = kB lnP vs. [chemical] potential energy µ.
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probability P of the whole system is simply the product
P =
∏
j= 1
Pj. (3)
Although the status of a system is accurately and precisely given
by the product form (Equation 3), one would prefer an additive
measure to make comparisons. In statistical mechanics entropy
S is the additive measure of a system’s status. It is obtained from
the logarithm of P
S = kB ln P =
1
T
∑
j= 1
Nj
[
kBT +
∑
k= 1
(
µk − µj + i1Qjk
)]
(4)
by multiplying with kB for historical reasons. The shorthand
notation µk = kBTlnNk + Gk, known as chemical potential for
the logarithm of density in energy Nkexp(Gk/kBT) is expedient
(Gibbs, 1902). Also Stirling’s approximation lnNj! ≈ NjlnNj – Nj
is convenient. It holds the better the largerNj. For instance, when
Nj > 100, the error relative to lnNj! < 1%. In the Equation 4 the
first term sums all energy that is bound in the system’s entities,
including, for example, the pool of neurotransmitter molecules.
The second term sums all energy differences, i.e., free energy
terms that reside within the system as well as between the system
and its surrounding systems, including, for instance, differences
in electrochemical potentials across the vesicle’s membrane.
All these forces drive the system and its surroundings toward
thermodynamic balance. The resulting change in entropy is
obtained from the time differential
dS
dt
=
1
T
∑
j= 1
dS
dNj
dNj
dt
=
1
T
∑
j= 1
dNj
dt
∑
k= 1
(
µk − µj + i1Qjk
)
(5)
Where dNj/dt denotes the change in Nj that result from
consumption of free energy6µjk – µj + i∆Qjk. For example, the
accumulation rate of transmitter molecules in the synaptic vesicle
dNj
dt
=
1
kBT
∑
k= 1
σjk
(
µk − µj + i1Qjk
)
(6)
is proportional to free energy by rate parameters σ jk > 0. Each
parameter is associated with a transformation mechanism, such
as an enzyme, that consumes free energy in the form of chemical
energy. An energy transducer of any kind is according to the
scale-free theory a system of its own. Hence, it is subject to
changes too. For example, a mutation in a gene may lead to an
altered catalytic activity, and hence affecting the flow rate from
the substrates to the products and vice versa.
Although we do not know the details of how the system
evolves from one state to another, the formal scale-free
expressions (Equations 1–6) include every detail down to the
precision of one quantum. In other words, the numerous flows of
energy in a complex system are all formally included in Equation
(5). Since there is no option to create the quanta from nothing
or to destroy the quanta for nothing, the flows will have to
direct along the least-time paths of free energy consumption. In
biological terms evolution from one state to another will naturally
select those means and mechanisms that facilitate survival. The
scale-free patterns are consequences of this least-time imperative
(Mäkelä and Annila, 2010).
When inserting Equation (6) to Equation (5), the quadratic
form proves the second law of thermodynamics, i.e., dS ≥ 0
both for 6µk – µj + i1Qjk > 0 and < 0. The thermodynamic
entropy cannot ever decrease. For example, the neurotransmitter
population will increase dNj > 0 when there are resources 6µk
– µj + i1Qjk > 0 for its production. Conversely, the population
will decline dNj < 0 when 6µk – µj + i1Qjk < 0. Thus, their
product in Equation (5) is always non-negative.
It is worth stressing that entropy by Equation (4) is a measure
of bound and free energy, not of disorder or the number of
microstates. Although the definition of P by Equation (3) differs
from the one referred to by the free-energy principle (Nicolis and
Prigogine, 1977; Haken, 1983; Friston et al., 2006; Friston, 2010),
the idea is the same: Evolution of any kind directs toward a free
energy minimum state. The least-time principle parallels also of
the principle of least effort (Zipf, 1949).
According to the holistic tenet any system is at the mercy
of its surroundings. Therefore, changes in surroundings will
manifest themselves as activity that will move the system
in quest of regaining balance. For instance, when a neuron
reverts its polarity, the synaptic vesicle will respond by
releasing neurotransmitters. Conversely, during repolarization
the transmitter population will recover, provided that there is
chemical potential available for the restoration. Note, irrespective
of which way the energy gradient lies between the system and its
surroundings, free energy can only decrease, and hence entropy
can only increase. At the maximum entropy state all forms of free
energy have been consumed, and accordingly all energy is bound
in the stationary populations. Then there are no net forces that
would drive the system away from the thermodynamic balance.
Many a living system hardly ever resides in thermodynamic
balance because its surroundings keeps changing, but formally
Equations (2–6) do express the path-dependent, and hence
intractable evolution toward balance as well as complex dynamics
at the balance.
It is worth underscoring that entropy by Equation (4) does
not convey any additional information about the system than
what is given in energetic terms, i.e., by multiplying S with T.
Thus, the least-time free energy consumptionmeans that entropy
will not only increase but it will increase at the maximal rate.
Importantly, S does not relate to disorder, i.e., incoherence. Order
or disorder is no end in itself but a mere consequence of free
energy consumption. Organization, just like disorder, follows
from the quest of consuming free energy. The widespread but
unwarranted association of entropy with disorder dates back
to the derivation of entropy for closed systems by Boltzmann.
Obviously, when the system is defined as invariant in energy,
nothing can change per definition. However, life is all about
changes, and for that matter, in the expanding Universe no
stationary motion will last forever either.
A Neural Network as a Thermodynamic
System
Thermodynamic terms are commonly used in metabolism, but
seldom applied in the context of cognition. However, there is
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no principal difference. Electromagnetic potentials of nerve cells
arise from chemical potentials, and hence neuronal signaling can
be expressed alike, in terms of the scalar potential U =
∫
µdN
due to bound quanta and in terms of the vector potential
Q=
∫
∆QdN due to absorbed or emitted quanta. Since Equations
(1–6) apply also for electromagnetism (Tuisku et al., 2009), a
network of neurons engaged in cognition is by thermodynamic
principle no different from a reaction network of chemical
compounds involved in metabolism. The neural network also
evolves, just as the chemical reaction mixture, by consuming free
energy in least time (Hartonen and Annila, 2012). For example,
evolution of a neural network from one state to another is about
accumulating products, e.g., physically embodied representations
of experiences and memories. Likewise, lapses and larger losses
of memories or mental skills invariably involve changes in the
neural network. However, we make no attempt to specify what
these changes are in detail, say in diagnostic terms, we only claim
that whatever they are, they all are formally contained in the
systems theory.
In concord with naturalistic consent we reason that all
cognitive processes, for example, learning is ultimately embodied
in neuronal systems or in some other systems. The chosen
definition of a system is inconsequential because all systems
amidst surrounding systems are perceived to evolve, develop and
mature, that is, to change from one state to another in one way
or another by consuming free energy in least time. Therefore,
irrespective of how one chooses to demark the system from its
surrounding, the bookkeeping of quanta in the system and of the
quantized influxes and eﬄuxes across the interface is perfect.
The freedom for one to define a system does not mean that the
classification would be meaningless. Namely, a natural interface
is there where strengths of interactions change significantly.
For example, neurons in the central nervous system (CNS)
are more strongly connected to each other than to rest of the
body. Accordingly, the brain and spinal cord are recognized
as subsystems of CNS, and, in turn, medulla, pons, thalamus,
hypothalamus, cerebellum, hippocampus, basal ganglia, etc., can
be recognized as subsystems of brain by their high internal
connectivity. The natural interfaces are not impermeable, only
fluxes across them are less intense than fluxes within the system.
Connectivity as the natural determinant of a system manifest
itself, for instance, when connections across callosum are
progressively reduced. The split-brain condition, where the two
lobes behave as distinct systems, does not emerge gradually but
abruptly (Tononi and Koch, 2015).We claim that the threshold is
reached when the free energy consumption via inter-hemisphere
connectivity falls significantly below the free energy consumption
via the intra-hemisphere connectivity. The underlying principle
is the same when two persons grow apart, they will at some stage
speak out the split. Likewise, when two populations in a country
grow more and more apart from each other, they will at some
point declare themselves as two independent nations.
It is worth stressing that the least-time imperative does not
specify any particular outcome, e.g., a split or union. This
means, for instance, that a memory circuit has evolved to
consume free energy by making an “appropriate” recollection,
not by recollecting an event exactly as it actually took place.
This energetically optimal conduct is customarily referred to as
survival. One may easily imagine circumstances where a frank,
yet unfaithful recollection will be vital, and scenarios where an
exact recollection would be fatal. The same conclusion has been
expressed in terms of utility in the context of vision (Purves
et al., 2015). Indeed, it is no new thought to think of cognition
as a means of survival, but still some might find it unusual
to speak about the fittest in thermodynamic terms without
making any distinction between animate and inanimate. It is this
universality of thermodynamics from which we draw insight to
consciousness.
CONSCIOUSNESS BY THE
THERMODYNAMIC TENET
According to thermodynamics there is nothing extraordinary
about consciousness; why it exists, what it does and how
it arises. On the contrary, its existence, functions and
arousal follow from the universal imperative. The Equations
(1–6) express in quantitative forms the general biological
position that consciousness is a result of evolution, among
all other characteristics. Thermodynamically speaking flows of
energy will naturally select those characteristic paths that will
level off energy differences in least time. According to this
perspective, consciousness integrates sensory and other inputs
with recollections and representations from the past for coherent
responses to consume energy gradients more effectively than by
unconscious deeds. In concord with common sense a conscious
person acts in a more meaningful way than an unconscious one.
The augmented consumption of free energy means enhanced
survival. In the following we will examine by the least-time free
energy perspective some well-known questions and established
stances about consciousness to enlighten its character.
On the Definition
One hand definitions serve to organize diversity of nature. On the
other hand a dividing line creates a problem because everything
depends on everything else. The border between one category
and another is practical but in the end ambiguous when things
change from one to the other. Ultimately one quantum of action
is enough to make a change from one category to the other. Most
notably it is hard to make a clear-cut distinction between living
and non-living, although the notions of animate and inanimate
themselves are practical. Similarly, it is unclear what exactly is
meant by an economy. For example, is a bee hive part of an
economic or an ecological system? Similarly, distinction between
consciousness and unconsciousness is useful but ambiguous. The
scope of awareness, wakefulness and sentience is wide and vague.
Also the range of subjectivity and the sense of selfhood are broad
and obscure. Capacity to experience and feel varies from one
individual to another as well as from one moment to another in
an individual.
Consciousness defies categorization precisely because it is
functional. The change is the very characteristic of a conscious
system. By the same token, a steady state does not display
causal relationships, i.e., irreversibility. A mere exchange of
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quanta without a net flow of energy between the system and its
surroundings does not drive the system from one state to another.
Despite these arguments one could perhaps imagine of
defining consciousness exactly by taking a snapshot of it. The still
frame, however, would not represent any changes, so it would be
devoid of the principle characteristic of consciousness. One could
eventually think of enclosing the conscious system by a fictitious
border, but only in a stationary system quantized trajectories are
closed, i.e., bounded. Put differently, evolving and invariant, just
as indefinable and definite, are mutually exclusive attributes.
It is no wonder that philosophers since Descartes and Locke
have struggled to pin down essential properties of consciousness,
because the definition depends on both the content and context
of what is deemed as essential, in fact, functional. For example,
search for neural, psychological and behavioral correlates is not
free from a preset idea of what consciousness is. Physically
speaking, the free energy consumption, i.e., functioning is
proportional to the changes in energy, not to some absolute
and invariant values of energy, i.e., stationarity. Therefore, the
search for a set of neural events and structures implies as if
consciousness was bounded by a definition rather than being an
open operational notion.
It worth emphasizing that not only consciousness but
also many other definitions are ambiguous by depending on
the subjective choice of key characteristics. For example, the
definition of an ecological community depends on what will
be listed as its characteristic organisms. Likewise, the definition
of a multi-cellular organism is dictated by the list of its cells.
The cell, in turn, is defined by its molecules, and so on. The
thermodynamic theory claims that definitions are ambiguous
when the change is the principal characteristic.
Obviously our account of consciousness by the universal
notation of physics encompassing everything reminds of
panpsychism, the philosophy that the mind is not only present in
humans but in all things (Seager and Allen-Hermanson, 2015).
We see this thought to emerge from the correct comprehension
that it is impossible to single out anyone evolving system,
specifically consciousness, from its surroundings as well as from
the accurate observations that all systems behave in the same way,
that is, consume free energy in least time. Then again, there is
hardly a point in equating the specific notion of mind with the
general notion of an evolving system. Thus, we refer to mind
merely as a practical term for what the brain does. Likewise, we
choose to speak about consciousness merely as an attribute for an
integrated system that is consuming free energy coherently.
Still, one might regard consciousness as an umbrella term, for
example, in analogy to furniture which, as a term, includes tables,
chairs, beds, etc. Since furniture refers to movable objects that
support various human activities such as seating and sleeping,
one should ask: What functions does consciousness support?
Only to realize that the list will remain open. Thus, there is no
closed definition for consciousness.
All in all, the trouble in defining consciousness appears to
us as contrived. Problems stem from attempts either to single
out or to separate consciousness from its surroundings or to
attribute consciousness with some unique rather than universal
characteristic. The renowned Cartesian dualism appears to us
an unfortunate misinterpretation that res cogitans, i.e., the realm
of thought would mean an immaterial domain and that res
extensa, i.e., the realm of extension, would mean the domain of
material things. Isn’t Descartes only naming the system capable of
interoception and exteroception as consciousness and referring
to the rest as its surroundings so that their interactions convene
in the brain? In our mind the purported qualitative distinction
between material and immaterial is not his message. Thus,
the mind–body problem of how non-physically labeled beliefs,
actions and thinking, etc., relate to the physically embodied
human being, appears to us utterly artificial.
On the Quantification
Although consciousness defies a closed definition, it is still
quantifiable in terms of entropy (Equation 4). The irrevocable
increase in entropy dtS ≥ 0 (Equation 5) implies somewhat
paradoxically the state of consciousness, measured by S, can
only increase. This is true when consciousness is understood
as the attribute of an integrated system that consumes free
energy relative to its surroundings, not relative to some absolute
invariant reference.
Despite the relativeness of entropy, one may easily imagine
in some absolute terms that the degree of consciousness has
been increasing over eons when humans have been consuming
energy differences relative to their energy-rich surroundings.
Consciousness will flourish when supplies are rich and versatile.
Conversely, when the surrounding resources narrow down so
that the subject faces hunger, sleep deprivation, stress, etc.,
consciousness will decrease relative to the arbitrary absolute
reference. However, the absolute value of entropy, high, or low
is only imaginary because entropy is in relation to resources,
i.e., a function of free energy (Equation 4). In biological
terms the cognitive capacity will adapt to circumstances. In
thermodynamic terms the cognitive system will regain balance
with its surroundings either by acquiring or abandoning some
subsystems and paths of energy transduction. Thus, a high level
of consciousness is no end in itself but consciousness, as any
other attribute of a system, develops and evolves to attain the
entropy maximum, i.e., the free energy minimum state in a given
circumstances. This is, of course, common sense. In poverty a
high level of awareness is simply unaffordable.
In practice there is hardly a way to sum up numerous bound
and free forms of energy to quantify consciousness. Above all it
is difficult to gauge all forms of free energy that are represented
in one’s neural network. These energy differences reside between
the system, known as the conscious self, and its surroundings.
For one thing, one’s perception of its surroundings is dynamic.
For the other thing, one’s identity, i.e., the system itself is an
ambiguous and dynamic notion that prevents from defining it as
distinct from its surrounding systems. For example, the problems
of altruism and tragedy of commons resolve by identifying one’s
identity (Annila and Salthe, 2009; Anttila and Annila, 2011).
Although exact quantification of consciousness remains
illusory its characteristics can be recognized from the
determinants of entropy and its change (Equations 4 and
5). Entropy, as the measure of state, increases with increasing
connectivity, not only by an increasing number of nodes,
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such as neurons, but also by an increasing capacity and rates
of mutual interactions (Figure 1). Thus, it is no coincidence
that the brain with the fastest processing capacity and highest
connectivity among all organs is the primary premise of
consciousness. Conversely, the conscious capacity will degrade
when connections and central nodes disintegrate but remains
largely untroubled by solitary losses. Still, it is worth emphasizing
that the comparison in absolute terms of entropy has no real
meaning because any state of consciousness is in relation to its
resources. High holism remains only imaginary when there are
no resources and no means to attain it.
On the Subjectivity
The subjective nature of consciousness is inherent in the
thermodynamic account (Figure 1 and Equations 1–6). Namely,
the system is the subject. The system is unique via its interactions
with its surroundings. A flow of quanta from the surroundings to
the system is not shared by any other system. For example, the
photon that one’s retina happens to absorb cannot be absorbed
by anyone else. Accordingly, there is no objective way of defining
or measuring any system because any observation will ultimately
embody a unique flow of energy from the target to the specific
observer. Thermodynamics of open systems acknowledges this
uniqueness, i.e., the subjective character of nature. The theory
works even when the system is defined at will, because it
keeps track of all quanta that move between the system and its
surroundings.
All meanings presented in various forms of free energy are
subjective. The way things appear to one depend on who one
is, that is to say, on evolutionary courses of human species and
its ancestors as well as on one’s own developmental processes
and experiences. Common sensations imply the same origin
and ordinary experiences where singular sensations indicate
diversification. Since no objective account can be given, it is best
to realize consequences of subjectivity. For example, one may
begin by defining gamma waves as a necessary, yet insufficient
characteristic of consciousness (Aru et al., 2002), and proceed
by including other characteristics. When completed with one’s
list, one may label consciousness as impaired or disrupted when
anyone of the predefined characteristics is missing or misplaced.
Neuronal and behavioral correlates of consciousness are
undoubtedly needed for medical diagnoses and other purposes,
but they are neither comprehensive nor objective. For instance,
alcohol and other drugs, or spiritual and meditative techniques
will alter the state of consciousness. This is sensed by the
subject itself and other subjects, but differently since flows of
energy are different. In turn, denial of impairment is a striking
example where the subject’s view of consciousness is deemed
by others as disturbed (Hirstein, 2005). The subjective character
of consciousness manifest itself pronouncedly when a patient,
who has become blind, claims to see normally and continues to
maintain the view despite all evidence to the contrary. This is
perplexing, yet ordinary in another context. Isn’t it only common
that despite all evidence to the contrary, many an individual
retains unrealistic thoughts about himself? Also, it is not unusual
that one assures of recalling an event which never happened.
Consciousness is not and it does not even aim to be a faithful, say
objective or inter-subjective representation of reality. It is one’s
response to reality.
According to thermodynamics a conscious system forms
from its constituent systems, like any other integrated hierarchy,
The conscious system will consume free energy along the
least-time paths, irrespective of how irrational these paths
are judged “objectively” by other systems. For example, the
changed meaning of a percept demonstrates how a tapered
connection will redirect signals, i.e., flows of energy, from a
sensory system to an “incorrect” locus at the cortical system.
It is odd but still understandable that one may sense the
sound of trumpet as “scarlet” (Krohn, 1892). The erroneous
outcome is no different from a train arriving on a wrong
platform because of a misplaced switch along the track. Put
differently, the curious complications are not normal but natural
according to the scale-free thermodynamic imperative. Our
viewpoint of subjectivity as a natural characteristic complies
with monistic consent that consciousness is a real subjective
experience embodied by physical processes in the brain. This
view is compatible with so-called biological realism at the
interface between neural and mental phenomena (Revonsuo,
2006; Freeman, 2007; Fingelkurts et al., 2009, 2010a, 2013).
On the Hierarchy
The scale-free thermodynamic theory pictures the conscious
system as comprising of systems (Salthe, 1985; Chialvo et al.,
2007; Fingelkurts et al., 2013; Werner, 2013). Consciousness
supervenes via least-time energy transduction from lower-level
systems, say neuronal networks that represent sensations,
coordination, memories, etc. In other words, knowing
with oneself integrates existing systems with inputs from
surroundings. This is to say, consciousness emerges in a form
that best serves the least-time imperative rather than being a
comprehensive report of either the state of mind or the state
of surroundings. This conclusion about consciousness, as an
integrated hierarchal construct, agrees with the impression that
consciousness is the opinion or internal feeling that one has from
what one does. Also that consciousness is deemed as unitary we
understand as the coherent outcome of integration, not that it
would mean a monolithic entity.
The view of consciousness supervening lower-level processes
parallels the proposition of various narrative fragments,
“drafts,” coming together the way a coherent behavior of an
individual calls for (Dennett, 1991; Chafe, 1994; Varela, 1999;
Freeman, 2007; Fingelkurts et al., 2010a, 2013). The need in
thermodynamic terms is a force that will expire by the least-time
free energy consumption. In view of that it is natural that new
aspects about oneself will surface to one’s mind first when one
senses corresponding driving forces. As long as one has no
mechanisms to sense such forces, it makes no difference if
someone else is aware of them. The blind is unaware of her
beautiful face, but when learning about it from others, may make
all the difference. In general, when sensory outputs from the
surroundings are deprived by and large, it will become difficult
to maintain a focused state of consciousness. The loss of external
energy gradients results in a peculiar state of consciousness
where theta waves prevail (Ballard, 1986). These low-frequency
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oscillations disperse farther away than gamma waves. The
extended scale of coherence underlines that consciousness is
at its brightest as a focused construct. Yet, consciousness does
not reside at any distinct locus in the neuronal network but
integrates functional loci to an attentive response (Baars, 1988;
Seth et al., 2005; Revonsuo, 2006; Tononi, 2008; Fingelkurts
et al., 2010a, 2013; Marchetti, 2012; De Sousa, 2013). Then again,
holism is emphasized when an optimal reaction recruits a broad
range of processes, including also unconscious functions.
Moreover, consciousness embodying to-and-fro flows of
energy (Figure 1) is consistent with observations that activity
in primary sensory areas alone is insufficient for consciousness
(Koch, 2004). Higher brain areas, especially the prefrontal cortex
is involved in a range of cognitive functions, so that executive
functions sum up from frontal cortex inputs and also so that
neural activity propagates down to sensory areas (Crick and
Koch, 2003). These up-and-down flows, so to speak upward and
downward causation (Kim, 1984; Meyering, 2003), are consistent
with a conscious system resulting from integration systems for
the least-time free energy consumption (Figure 1).
On the Hard Problem
The so-called hard problem of consciousness is about how a
physical process in the brain gives rise to subjective experience
(Chalmers, 1995). The eminent claim is that even complete
knowledge of the brain would not yield complete knowledge of
conscious experience. The assertion means, for example, that
even if one knew everything about how the brain processes colors,
one would not know what it is like to see them.
According to thermodynamics subjectivity is the characteristic
of any system. It is the only option. Subjectivity is not only
associated with experience, but equally so with information
processing such as reasoning, reporting, focusing attention,
etc. Since many immediate stages of information processing at
sensory organs are known in quite some detail, it may seem as
if there were nothing subjective in the elementary processes, e.g.,
following the photon absorption at retina. But there are subtle
differences among the involved entities. One retinal molecule, as
a system of atoms, may seem identical to another one, but each
setting is unique. The energy differences, say electromagnetic
fields, about the molecule are dictated by everything else, e.g.,
by other molecules, whose coordination is not identical, i.e.,
symmetrical for anyone molecule. When the surroundings is
unique, also the system is unique, which manifests itself, for
instance, as a unique molecular conformation. Undoubtedly it
would be very difficult to resolve these subtle differences, e.g.,
fine structure of electronic orbitals imposed by the surrounding
fields. This degree of subjectivity, i.e., energy differences between
various retinal molecules, is much smaller than that higher up
in hierarchy. Using a powerful microscope there is no difficulty
to resolve differences in cells that house those seemingly similar
retinal molecules. Unmistakably the cells are subjects. Further
up along the line of information processing there are more and
more diversity, i.e., energy differences among representations.
Therefore, we claim that there is no qualitative difference between
the elementary percept of a color that is defined by the photon
wavelength and the color-induced subjective experience that
is represented uniquely by numerous energy attributes of a
neuronal network. The degree of subjectivity is ultimately gauged
in energetic terms, and hence the subjective experience does not
single out from other phenomena.
The specific experience, i.e., the particular series of changes
in one’s neural system, depends on one’s history. The past
processes dictate what paths are available as well as what forms
of free energy are at disposal to open up new paths or to close
down existing paths to represent the experience. Therefore, what
exactly one will experience beyond mere perception of light
depends on these diverse assets that one has accumulated during
life and inherited from ancestors as well as on forces that are
imposed by the surroundings. For example, the experience will be
moderated when the visual stimulus is accompanied with sound
or sense of touch (Witten and Knudsen, 2005).
No question, the mere perception of color is a simpler and
more predictable process than the full experience, simply because
changes in energy are smaller and less dispersed at the retinal
molecules than those associated with the experience of color at
cortical levels. Still, we see no evidence that the two processes
would be qualitatively different from each other. Put differently,
we cannot see that introspection, as knowing about one’s mental
life, and phenomenality, as having experience about something it
is like, would be qualitatively distinct from each other. For the
same reason, not all of that what is conscious can be categorized
simply as introspective or phenomenal. A finer classification
beyond introspection and phenomenality is conceivable (Lycan,
1996), but to us the reductionist approach when missing the
integrated character of consciousness, does not seem particularly
insightful.
Undoubtedly certain aspects of cognition are more accessible
for one to report verbally, reason and to control than others
such as experiences of sounds, sensations, emotions, feelings,
and others coined as qualia. Nevertheless, we see no line
of demarcation between introspection and phenomenality.
Isn’t it exactly about a fine line between introspection and
phenomenality why one admires an artist who is able to portray
something one cannot quite picture and spokesman who is able
voice something what one cannot quite express?
We do not deny that there are various aspects about
consciousness, but their categorization is ambiguous, subjective
and circumstantial. For example, there are numerous reports
from battlefields when pain is not experienced (Morrison and
Bennett, 2006). The subject recognizes the loss of a leg and
even reasons its immediate consequences pretty much the same
way as his comrades, by shouting “bring a stretcher”. The tense
circumstances call for vital activities that suppress experiencing
the loss thoroughly. Cognition focuses for survival, that is,
for the least-time free energy consumption. Only later, when
circumstances allow, the meaning of loss, something it is like,
will be sensed beyond a verbal account. No words will say it all,
because walking is distinct from speaking. No images will expose
it all either, because walking is distinct from seeing. For one thing,
pain is experienced because touch with the leg is lost. For the
other thing, agony is experienced because one’s identity is at stake.
The leg is an integral part of oneself. Sorrow gauges the loss of
one’s compromised future possibilities as a disabled. One is in for
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a major restructuring of neuronal representations of oneself to
match the new state of affairs. Yet, all what is experienced due
to the loss of a leg is ultimately commensurable in terms of free
energy. Loss of a toe as a less devastating experience would entail
a smaller revision in one’s free energy spectrum.
It is common that music, say a certain melody, will trigger a
strong subjective experience, when one associates a whole lot with
the piece. Similarly, a familiar scene or a memorable scent might
move one from one state of consciousness to another. Curiously,
many a scientist has described the moment of a discovery as
an elation (Birney, 2013). Apparently mere introspection is not
enough to construct the full meaning of a sensational discovery.
Only the experience by integrating a whole lot more does do the
full justice.
Consciousness as an integrative process is best comprehended
in holistic terms. In a sense consciousness amplifies, or more
accurately inflates, an elementary sensory signal to an experience
by integrating various assets from the past. Also Locke’s portrayal
of consciousness as the perception of what passes in a man’s
own mind we like to read so that consciousness is an inflated
perception. Likewise, the idea that consciousness is about
broadcasting information around the brain from one’s memory
bank (Baars, 1988), we like take to mean that consciousness
emerges principally from the existing assets whereas the primary
trigger makes only a minor component in the final product.
The Latin phrase conscius sibi, literally as knowing with oneself,
provides yet a complementary perspective on the system of
systems by emphasizing that consciousness is about sharing the
present impulse with representations of the past.
On the Binding Problem
The least-time imperative provides perspective also on how brain
creates from sensory inputs coherent perceptual experience. This
binding problem (Revonsuo and Newman, 1999; Singer, 2001)
comprises both the problem of how the brain segregates elements
in an input pattern to discrete entities and the problem of how
the brain constructs a phenomenological object from the entities.
This formulation parallels the metastability concept (Kelso, 1995,
2012; Bressler and Kelso, 2001; Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2004;
Fingelkurts et al., 2009).
It is a common experience when listening to a foreign
language, that one has a hard time to distinguish individual
words. The separation of words is impaired because one’s
analyzer is not yet tuned to recognize contrasts, i.e., energy
differences among sounds. Undoubtedly one’s ear is capable of
consuming energy differences in the changes of pitch, but in
successive stages of neuronal processing the input fails to recruit
one’s memory to amplify the unacquainted input to meanings.
The unfamiliar input does not trigger further consumption of
free energy to produce meanings. Likewise, when facing an
unusual view, perhaps after being knocked down all of a sudden,
one struggles to discern objects in sight because the familiar
reference, as the source of meanings, is tilted. Therefore, we argue
that elements in sensory inputs are segregated by consuming
free energy in least time. This involves mechanisms that have
been established in the course of one’s life as well as inherited
from the course of evolution. Thus, the outcome of segregation is
subjective and context-dependent. One looks for meanings every
day, yet practically every textbook of biology shuns the idea that
there are meanings and purposes, physically speaking forces, in
nature.
Consistently, the construction of an object from the segregated
elements is guided by the least-time free energy consumption.
The brain is equippedwithmechanisms from the past to assemble
an object from the segregated ingredients as well as from those
ingredients that are available in memory for the integration
process. It is not unusual to jump into conclusions which
demonstrates that the construction is not and does not even aim
to be faithful and consistent. It is biased by prior expectations,
physically speaking, by energy gradients. One’s conclusion is
motivated by gradients in the evolving energy landscape that
one’s neuronal network is representing.
Admittedly, the thermodynamic tenet clarifies only the
principle of how experiences are constructed, not mechanistic
details of the processes, for instance, in terms of neuronal
correlates. Yet, thermodynamics indicates that familiar stimuli
will invoke more rapid, intense and wide-spread responses than
unfamiliar stimuli, simply because “familiar” associates with what
is already present. Put differently, when a lot of free energy is
consumed, things make a lot of sense, and conversely nothing is
consumed by non-sense. This may well appear as differentiation
of brain states during meaningful stimuli vs. non-meaningful
stimuli (Boly et al., 2015).
On the Intractability
It is in place to make few remarks on the integration process
itself. The evolutionary equation (Equation 5) reveals that
motions consume their driving forces which, in turn, affect the
motions, and so on. Mathematically speaking the equation is
inseparable, and hence it cannot be solved. Thus, there is no
algorithm for consciousness. This point is familiar from the
Chinese room argument (Searle, 1980). Consciousness emerges
in a non-deterministic manner. Yet, supervenience is not a
random, i.e., indeterminate, but a path-dependent process. In
other words, one does not know exactly what one will think
before thinking and one does not know exactly what one
will experience before experiencing. We reason that due to
intractability certain neural and behavior responses correlate
with consciousness at times while at other times they appear
as uncorrelated. Therefore, inability to make precise predictions
about cognition are ultimately not due to complexity of the
process but due to its path-dependent character.
From the thermodynamic perspective probabilistic inference
models, most notably Bayesian models (Knill and Pouget, 2004;
Bielza and Larrañaga, 2014) including prior knowledge, mimic
natural processes, but the modeled probabilities are not faithful
representations of energetics (Equation 3), only parameters.
Moreover, the original Markov chain does not carry memory of
past events, but only the current state determines the probability
distribution of the next state. Even when the future state is
modeled to depend on a sequence of the past states (Camproux
et al., 1996; Seidemann et al., 1996), the ensuing projection, i.e.,
a trend does not parallel the actual energy gradient because in
reality the force is affected by the motion itself.
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On the Intentionality
To be directed toward a goal or thing is an apparent characteristic
of consciousness (Evans, 1970). By the free energy perspective
an intention means a force, that is, an energy gradient. A
conscious mind gazes for various forms of free energy and
exploits opportunities to consume them. The intention is fulfilled
when associated free energy is fully consumed.
Since these driving forces are sensed by oneself, intentions are
subjective. Ambivalent intensions imply that one has difficulties
in constructing the resultant force. Also ambiguity about oneself
may trouble the process. For example, one might commit a crime
intentionally, only to realize later that the act in fact hurts oneself.
In other words, one’s identity was at the critical moment so
narrow that only immediate forces manifested themselves.
In addition to conscious intentions there are also other
forms of free energy that one is unconscious about, that is, are
not integrated for coherence responses. Subliminal stimuli, e.g.,
presented as flashes, are too short substrates for the construction
of consciousness. Nevertheless, these flows of energy will suffice
to prime or bias one for an intended action (Loftus and
Klinger, 1992). Thermodynamically speaking, the subliminal
stimuli shape the energy landscape of one’s mind to channel more
readily a more comprehensive flow of energy later. In terms of
neuroscience the subliminal stimuli lead to construction of some
connections but apparently not enough to pave the full way to
consciousness.
The thermodynamic tenet gives also a practical meaning to
the philosophical concept of free will (O’Connor, 2014). Free will
equates with free energy in one’s disposal (Annila and Salthe,
2010b). One may execute at most as much as one has free energy
in command. Non-determinism means that when one invests
free energy to pursue along a path then some other paths are
no longer affordable. This is to say, one is responsible as much
as one is in capacity to consume free energy. For example, when
in captivity, one is limited to act or even to express oneself, and
hence free energy only in metabolic form powers free thinking.
When deprived from free energy altogether, one has no choices
whatsoever to respond by moving from one state to another, i.e.,
one is no longer responsive.
On the Rate
Why does the experience of oneself reel at a particular rate,
at about one “frame” per 100ms (Potter et al., 2014)? The
coherence calls for synchrony (Singer and Gray, 1995). However,
consciousness cannot cohere at the maximal firing rate of
individual neurons because inputs must exist before they can
integrate to the high-level construct. The common experience of
escaping from danger by a reflex reaction demonstrates that more
time is consumed in integrating awareness than that it takes for
subsystems to act. This emphasizes that the notion of self is not a
monolith but a composed union.
The reflex reaction demonstrates also that synchrony,
e.g., gamma waves of reticular activating system, alone is
insufficient indicator of consciousness. For example, visual
information can control behavior without producing a conscious
sensation. Fluent functions, i.e., automated sequences remain
unconsciously generated until a change away from the ordinary
happens. This implies that consciousness is a response, physically
speaking a reaction to consume free energy, not in an algorithmic
fashion, but in a non-determinate way.
Sleep by displaying a wide range of frequencies gives
insight to wakefulness. After a daily dose of high-frequency
stimulation the sleep, as a natural process, serves to revise the
brain’s connectivity spectrum toward a free energy minimum
partition. In particular, long wavelengths of deep sleep amend
long-range connectivity. Sleeping on a problem, exemplifies the
value of balancing neuronal network by adjusting connections,
i.e., making new thoughts (Bos et al., 2011). In turn, short
wavelengths of sleep, characterized by rapid eye movement
(REM), tweak the short-range connectivity, but without the
objective of conscious free energy consumption. Therefore, vivid
dreams do not necessarily make sense, i.e., cohere. The fact
that most muscles are paralyzed during sleep, also implies that
sleep, by its broadband iterative choreography, consumes in a
path-dependent manner a whole range of imbalances in the
brain’s connectivity spectrum. In contrast, consciousness, by its
high-band coherent activity, consumes various forms of free
energy in the subject’s spectrum of surroundings.
On the Problem of Other Minds
The question whether animals and organisms in general are
conscious or not, is according to the thermodynamic tenet,
like many other queries, troubled by ambiguity in defining
consciousness. Nonetheless, it is possible to assess the degree of
consciousness by the free energy consumption. Of course, one
can still imagine a system that is conscious but not responsive,
as in a lock-in syndrome (Nordgren et al., 1971), but it is
inconceivable that a high-degree consciousness as the integrated
response would emerge in the first place via minimal interactions
with its surroundings.
The thermodynamic tenet asserts that consciousness is
subjective in the spirit of the influential essay (Nagel, 1974)What
is it like to be a bat? The writing argues that an organism is
conscious if and only if there is something that it is like to be
that organism—something it is like for the organism. A dog can
be conscious about those forms of free energy that it can access,
say, in the form of food and shelter. Its consciousness manifests
itself as behavioral correlates, for example, defending its master.
A bacterium is likewise consciousness of its free energy sources,
say, in the form of sugar, by displaying chemotaxis as its coherent
behavioral correlate. An ion is consciousness about its driving
forces, say, in the form of electromagnetic fields by responding
to them by motion and deformation.
So, what is it like to be a dog, bat or a bacterium? One
may relate to another system as much as one shares the
same means and mechanisms to consume the same forms of
free energy. Apparently the human being shares with the dog
some means of companionship, and hence one experiences
collaborative behavior associated consumption of free energy
somewhat similar to the dog. For one to know, what it is like
to be piloting as a bat does, is possible only as much as one is
able to navigate solely by hearing echoes. Still, if one were blind,
one would value this skill as much as one is able to benefit from
it. For one to know, what it is like to be a bacterium, is possible
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 11 March 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 27
Annila On the Character of Consciousness
up to the degree that one shares the same metabolic machinery.
Of course for one it means hardly anything to digest few sugar
molecules. In this respect it is not much of anything to be a
bacterium. Though, something when the intake of sugar leads
to the integrated function of chemotaxis. Obviously the question
about other minds is not only about how much one shares with
diverse animate and inanimate the samemachinery of free energy
consumption but more relevantly about how much shares with
other human beings. Indeed, peer support is highly valuable.
The scale-free thermodynamics recognizes consciousness on
other levels of natural hierarchy. For example, awareness of a
nation accumulates from numerous activities, such as surveys,
polls, and compilation of statistics on various things as well
as from foreign sources by diverse means. To compare these
activities with those that construct consciousness in a human
being is, of course, nothing new. Already Hobbes wrote that
Where two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are
said to be conscious of it one to another (Hobbes, 1651). Also the
Latin word conscius by literally meaning knowing together implies
the scale-free character of consciousness. Specifically, when we
claim that a society is consciousness too, we do not exactly
mean Durkheim’s collective conscience of beliefs and sentiments
among members of a society (Durkheim, 1893) but refer to the
natural processes that integrate the society for the coherent free
energy consumption. These integrated actions, i.e., culture as a
whole (Annila and Salthe, 2010b), can be regarded as meaningful
or responsible, i.e., conscious. It is not about analogy between a
consciousness society and a consciousness individual, it is about
equality because the theory describes both systems exactly the
same way.
The scale-free stance is of a practical value. Namely, it is
much easier to observe how the society acquires and integrates
information to act in an orchestrated manner and how the
society cultivates its identity than it is to obtain data and
relate recordings from the human brain to responses and
development of the self. For example, certain structures, say,
claustrum in the brain and a central hub in the computer
network are alike critical for the construction of consciousness
and situational picture of the nation (Crick and Koch, 2005).
Consciousness is unable to manifest itself when claustrum
is disturbed, and similarly the government cannot command
when the central hub is out of power. However, not any
one vital mechanism is the locus of consciousness. Instead
consciousness integrates subsystems to a hierarchal construct
in a path-dependent manner. This portrayal resembles the
model for spotting meanings in percepts that integrates sensory
information to virtual associative networks (Yufik, 1998). The
thermodynamic theory bears also a clear resemblance to the
integrated information theory of consciousness (Tononi, 2008).
The universality in the laws of physics has been recognized earlier
to underlie characteristics of consciousness such as criticality,
self-organization and emergence (Fingelkurts et al., 2013). All
in all, we have not put forward a more acute account on
consciousness but merely related the prior comprehension to the
profound and universal physical basis.
The universality of thermodynamics implicates also artificial
consciousness (Russell and Norvig, 2009). Machine’s ability to
exhibit intelligent behavior equivalent to or indistinguishable
from that of a human being is not an issue, because
thermodynamics does not make such a classification.
Accordingly, a functionally equivalent but non-conscious
organism, i.e., a philosophical zombie (Kirk, 2009) cannot
possibly have the same survival advantage, i.e., capacity to
consume free energy, as the conscious organism. Consciousness
is not an epiphenomenon, but a reaction to forces. From this
perspective realization of cognitive robotics is not an algorithmic
problem, i.e., not a task of automating versatile and fine motor
skills. Consciousness entails embedding evolutionary history
and life experience, i.e., a long series of changes, to the machine.
Without extensive free energy perspective the machine, just like
a human being, will be small-minded. In other words such a
creature will not have many processes to integrate for a coherent
response. According to Equation (1) it will take time to acquire
comprehensive cognitive capacity.
CONCLUSIONS
The least-time free energy consumption is hardly a new
perspective on consciousness. Our interpretations and
conclusions about consciousness are not original either.
The main point is holistic. We regard consciousness, like any
other phenomenon, as a manifestation of the natural law.
Therefore, the proposed percept is falsifiable, not only by
measurements of consciousness, but also by observations on
anything else that will disprove the axiomatic basis, namely that
quantized actions embody everything. Then again, due to our
narrow knowledge and lack of expertize we might have reasoned
incorrectly or imprecisely how the mind displays the universal
principle in some cases, but such lapses do not jeopardize the
theory itself, but call for a revision. Unquestionably our account
of consciousness is far from being exhaustive, but hopefully it
would be exemplary enough to motivate counterarguments and
to provoke discourse.
The notion of information, so central in neuroscience,
is conspicuous by its absence. To correct for this shortage
we maintain that quanta embody also information in one
form or another. Accordingly, information is subject to the
universal imperative and its manifestation (Karnani et al.,
2009). Specifically, information equates with free energy that
is consumed by its receiver. In other words, the meaning of
a message is subjective. This definition of information in the
tangible terms of physics differs from that given by the abstract
information entropy (Shannon, 1948).
Obviously there are other consciousness-associated notions
besides information which we have not addressed. Just for
curiosity we demonstrate the power of considering everything
in terms of quanta by inspecting the association of mass with
consciousness that was proposed in the popular thriller The Lost
Symbol (Brown, 2009). The suggestion makes sense, because any
change of state, say from conscious to unconscious, invariably
involves either emission of quanta from the system to the
surroundings or vice versa. The dissipated quanta carry energy
E ultimately to the vacuum characterized by the squared speed of
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light c2. The ensuing change in energy dE relates to the change
in mass by dE = dmc2. The familiar relationship is pronounced
in nuclear reactions, but discernable in chemical reactions, and
inferable from gravitational changes.
Finally, one might ask: What a conclusion drawn from
the least-time imperative stands out as the most insightful?
Reminding of the subjective character of consciousness, it may
be that only we find it somewhat surprising that consciousness
is mostly generated from archives of mind and comparatively
little from momentary inputs. On second thought in this
way one will generate integrated responses in least time.
This revelation allows us to understand also that it is only
natural, not belligerent that an unconventional but profound
perception hardly finds any place to take root in an established
mind.
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